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Warrant Requirement for Bugged
Informants Under the California
Right to Privacy
Encroachment on individual privacy through the use of electronic
surveillance devices has been made alarmingly possible by modern
technological advancements.' Recently, federal agents employing this
investigative technique videotaped acceptances of bribes by high ranking
state and national government officials, which resulted in the ABSCAM
arrests.2 The defendants' arguments that the videotaping had violated
their constitutional rights were rejected and they were found guilty
of official corruption. 3 Currently, uncertainty exists concerning the
extent to which the use of electronic surveillance is subject to con-
stitutional protections to prevent ensnarement of the innocent.' In
the absence of restraints, such as the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution,s the ultimate anxiety
is police omniscience of personal affairs.6
The essence of the fourth amendment is the protection of privacy
from arbitrary intrusion by the state.7 Freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures is protected by the requirement of a warrant
based upon probable cause and a particular description of the place
to be searched and the thing to be seized.' The purpose of the fourth
amendment warrant requirement 9 is to ensure that adequate facts exist,
as determined by a neutral judicial officer, to justify an invasion of
privacy.'" The United States Supreme Court has expressed a strong
1. Courtney, Electronic Eavesdropping, Wire Tapping and Your Right to Privacy, 26
FED. Com. B.J. 1, 7 (1973).
2. ABSCAM A Fair and Effective Method of Fighting Public Corruption, in ABsc m
ETcs 8 (G. Caplan ed. 1983).
3. Id. at 3.
4. Id. at 4.
5. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and persons or things to be seized.
Id.
6. Lopez v. U.S., 373 U.S. 427, 466 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
7. Courtney, supra note 1, at 6.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. Id.
10. Courtney, supra note 1, at 6.
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preference for the use of warrants. I The Court has reasoned that
a decision by a detached magistrate protects against hurried decisions
made by police while actively engaged in the enterprise of ferreting
out crime.' 2
In United States v. White,'3 a four-person plurality of the Court
held that no warrant is required prior to the use of bugged infor-
mants by government agents.' In White, the defendant had objected
under the fourth amendment to use of an agent's testimony concern-
ing incriminating statements the defendant had made to an informer."
The informer had worn a transmitter, allowing the agent to overhear
his conversation with the defendant.' 6 The government had failed to
seek a warrant prior to the electronic surveillance.' 7
This comment proposes that a warrant should be required prior
to the use of bugged informants in criminal investigations. California
should reject White under the state constitutional right to privacy,' 8
which affords protection against threats to personal privacy 9 from
governmental surveillance and data collecting activities.2" Initially, an
examination of the recent adoption of Proposition 82' in California
will be made to demonstrate that the author's proposal is viable despite
the truth-in-evidence section22 of that state constitutional amendment.
An in-depth view will be taken of the early federal cases leading up
to White which will reveal the flaws in the rationale of that case.
A discussion of the current state of the law in California concerning
the use of bugged informants will follow. This comment will examine
cases in Michigan and Alaska, two states that have rejected White,
with emphasis on the grounds for rejection. A discussion of current
interpretations of the California right to privacy will demonstrate why
the provision is an appropriate vehicle for rejecting White. This discus-
sion will include commentary on state Penal Code sections23 aimed
at protecting against invasions of privacy, which will reveal the breadth
11. See, e.g., U.S. v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105-06 (1965) (search warrant); Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (arrest warrant).
12. Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 105-06.
13. U.S. v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
14. Id. at 751 (Justice Brennan concurred in the result only).
15. Id. at 748-49.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. CAL. CONST. art. I, §1.
19. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 773, 533 P.2d 222, 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 105 (1975).
20. Id.
21. CAL. CONsr. art. I, §28 (Proposition 8 enacted in June 1982).
22. Id. §28(d).
23. CAL. PENAL CODE §§630-637.5.
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of the proposed protection under the state constitutional right to
privacy.
The degree of protection available under the right to privacy will
vary depending on the competing individual and societal interests
involved.24 A discussion of the competing interests when electronic
surveillance devices are used will reveal that no significant burden
will be imposed on law enforcement by requiring a warrant. Finally,
this comment will establish the minimum standards of the procedural
components of the proposed warrant requirement. The first step toward
rejecting White under the California right to privacy, however, is an
examination of the Proposition 8 truth-in-evidence section.
"RIGHT TO TRUTH-IN-EVIDENCE"
Recently, California voters amended the state constitution to in-
clude provisions known as the "Victims' Bill of Rights." 2 One of
the sections is entitled "Right to Truth-In-Evidence. ' 26 The section
provides that "[e]xcept as provided by statute hereafter enacted by
a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature,
relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding.
• .., Uncertainty, therefore, exists concerning the extent to which
California courts may rely on independent state grounds to impose
higher standards under the state constitution than those required in
the federal system. An examination of the intent of Proposition 8
and application of rules for construction of constitutional provisions
will demonstrate the viability of excluding evidence obtained by the
warrantless use of electronic surveillance under the right to privacy.
The fundamental rule for construing initiative measures is to ascer-
tain the intent of the lawmakers to effectuate the purpose of the law.2'
The Legislative Analyst's ballot pamphlet analysis may be helpful in
determining the probable meaning of the initiative.2 ' The analysis of
the truth-in-evidence section of Proposition 8 states that this measure
generally will allow most relevant evidence to be admitted subject to
exceptions the Legislature may enact in the future."0 Prior to Pro-
24. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d at 760-61, 533 P.2d at 224, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
25. CAL. CONST. art. I, §28.
26. Id. §28(d).
27. Id. For the purpose of this discussion, the author assumes that the evidence obtained
through the warrantless use of electronic surveillance is relevant to the charges subsequently
adjudicated.
28. People v. Harrison, 150 Cal. App. 3d 1142, 1155, 198 Cal. Rptr. 762, 770 (1984).
29. Id.
30. Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 302, 651 P.2d 274, 316, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30,
72 (1982).
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position 8, evidence obtained through unlawful eavesdropping or
wiretapping could not be used in court.3 ' The Legislative Analyst's
use of the words "generally" and "most," however, merely adds to
the uncertainty of the scope of the truth-in-evidence provision.
The express purpose of the law is found in section 28, subdivision
(a).32 The text reflects an intent to ensure a bill of rights for victims
of crime through creation of a right to restitution and a basic expec-
tation that felons will be appropriately detained, tried, and sufficiently
punished by the courts. 33 The section calls for broad reforms in the
procedural treatment of accused persons and sentencing of convicted
persons."
These reforms are focused on that period of time after a crime
has been committed. This author's concern is for the procedures
employed during the period of discovery or prevention of crime. For
example, once a person has become a police detainee, case law holds
a reasonable expectation of privacy no longer exists. 31 At the point
of detention, clearly, a compelling public need exists that warrants
intrusion on privacy, under the proposed right to privacy protection.36
From this perspective, the author's proposal is consistent with the
express purpose of the law in section 28, subdivision (a).37
Arguments in favor of Proposition 8, also contained in the ballot
pamphlet, further reflect what the law was intended and expected to
achieve.38 These arguments voice the concern that the state courts have
created additional rights for the criminally accused, in derogation of
the rights of innocent victims of violent crimes." The rebuttal argu-
ment is that Proposition 8 needlessly reduces personal liberties, and
as an example, states that the law would condone use of wiretapping
without a warrant. 40
The author agrees with this assessment that Proposition 8 goes too
far in attempting to provide aid to victims of crimes. 4 ' Electronic
surveillance of conversations in the hopes of discovering or prevent-
ing criminal activity risks the freedoms of noncriminals. 42 A person
31. Id.
32. CA. CONST. art. I, §28(a).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See infra notes 281-83 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 252-66 and accompanying text.
37. CAL. CoNsr. art. I, §28(a).
38. Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 305, 651 P.2d at 319, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See infra notes 315-18 and accompanying text.
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need not be a criminal to be a victim of this investigative technique.43
Only two provisions of Proposition 8 relate directly to victims,44
therefore, the asserted intent of the law45 is contradicted by the actual
text of the law.
Another basic rule for construing constitutional amendments is that
words and phrases are not to be viewed in isolation, but in the con-
text of other provisions bearing on the same subject.4 7 The goal is
to harmonize all related constitutional provisions without distorting
their meaning and to give effect to the scheme as a whole.48 The
California constitutional provisions against unreasonable searches and
seizures, 49 the right to privacy,5" and the truth-in-evidence section of
Proposition 851 all bear on the admissibility of evidence. 2 The Prop-
osition 8 provision, therefore, must be interpreted in harmony with
the two other related constitutional provisions. 3 By thus comparing
the truth-in-evidence provision with the right to privacy and the right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, the analysis leads
to one final rule of construction for constitutional provisions.
A specific provision will govern a general provision, even though
the general one, standing alone, is broad enough to include the sub-
ject to which the specific provision relates.5 4 The specific provision
is treated as an exception that qualifies the general provision, 55 especial-
ly when they are inconsistent.16 The specific provision will govern
whether passed before or after the general provision. 7 A subsequent
43. Id.
44. Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 271, 651 P.2d at 295, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 51 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
45. CAL. CONST. art. I. §28(a).
46. Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 271, 651 P.2d at 295, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 51 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
47. Armstrong v. County of San Mateo, 146 Cal. App. 3d 597, 610-11, 194 Cal. Rptr.
294, 301 (1983).
48. Id., at 611, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 301.
49. CAL. CoNST. art. I, §13.
50. Id. §1.
51. Id. §28(d).
52. See, e.g., Cleaver v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 297, 307, 594 P.2d 984, 989, 155
Cal. Rptr. 559, 564 (1979) (admissibility under provision against unreasonable searches and
seizures); People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 895, 506 P.2d 232, 239, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408, 415
(1973) (admissibility of evidence under right to privacy); In re Lance W., 149 Cal. App. 3d
838, 845-46, 197 Cal. Rptr. 331, 335-36 (1983) (admissibility under the truth-in-evidence section
of Proposition 8).
53. State Bd. of Equalization v. Board of Supervisors, 105 Cal. App. 3d 813, 822, 164
Cal. Rptr. 739, 744 (1980).
54. Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 724, 123 P.2d 505, 512 (1942).
55. Id. at 723-24, 125 P.2d at 512.
56. Id.
57. In re Williamson, 43 Cal. 2d 651, 654, 276 P.2d 593, 594 (1954).
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general provision, however, may repeal a prior specific provision in
general words. 8
The analysis begins with determining whether the truth-in-evidence
provision is general or specific. The pertinent language of the section
provides that "relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal
proceeding." 59 In Brosnahan v. Brown,60 a case challenging Proposi-
tion 8 as violating the single subject rule for initiatives, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court upheld the law,6' but noted the broad sweep of
the matters contained within it.62 The dissent in Brosnahan also stressed
the breadth of the provisions. 3 Specifically, the dissent questioned
the effect of the truth-in-evidence provision on dozens of specific
evidence code sections." The dissent concluded that subdivision (d)
of section 28, as written, could affect every criminal proceeding.6"
Clearly, the only qualifying language in the truth-in-evidence provi-
sion is that the evidence must be relevant.66 The section, therefore,
must be viewed as a general constitutional provision 67 that will be
controlled by any related specific provision.68
The California right to privacy is included among the various in-
alienable rights of the people.69 The right to privacy, therefore, is
incapable of being surrendered without the consent of those possess-
ing the right."0 Although the majority in Brosnahan held that Pro-
position 8 concerned matters having one general object,7' the opinion
is devoid of the dissenters' analysis of the issue of whether the voters
were aware of the contents of the initiative. 72 The dissent states that
the voters could have had no idea of the scope of the changes section
28, subdivision (d) would implement. 73 Adoption of Proposition 8,
including the sweeping truth-in-evidence provision, therefore, cannot
be viewed as a surrender of the inalienable right to privacy.74
58. Id.
59. CA.. CONST. art. I, §28(d).
60. 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982).
61. CA. CONST. art. II, §8(d).
62. Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 246, 651 P.2d at 280, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
63. Id. at 271, 651 P.2d at 295, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
64. Id. at 275, 651 P.2d at 297-98, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 54.
65. Id.
66. CAL. CONSr. art. I, §28(d).
67. See supra notes 54-66 and accompanying text.
68. County of Humboldt v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 147 Cal. App. 3d 595, 602,
195 Cal. Rptr. 181, 185 (1983).
69. CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, §1.
70. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 683 (5th ed. 1979).
71. Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 247, 651 P.2d at 280, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
72. Id. at 278-79, 651 P.2d at 300, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
73. Id. at 285, 651 P.2d at 304, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 60.
74. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
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The ballot pamphlet for the right to privacy amendment states that
the provision is aimed at providing protection against encroachment
by surveillance and data collecting activities." The specific purpose
is to prevent government and business from collecting, stockpiling,
and misusing unnecessary information."6 These clear statements of the
intent behind the right to privacy reveal the specific situations in which
it may be invoked. 77 The specific constitutional right to privacy,
therefore, will govern over the general truth-in-evidence section of
Proposition 8,78 even though that section was adopted subsequent to
the right to privacy amendment."
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that, despite adoption of the
truth-in-evidence provision of Proposition 8, California courts still
maintain the power to impose a higher standard under the state con-
stitutional right to privacy in electronic surveillance cases than that
required by the federal constitution.8" In the recent superior court
decision of In re Lance W.,8 1 however, the court held that the truth-
in-evidence provision completely abolished the use of independent state
grounds to exclude relevant evidence. 2 The defendant argued that
his rights under the state constitutional provision against unreasonable
searches and seizures" had been violated, which required exclusion
of the evidence obtained against him." The broad issue in Lance was
the protection California may offer against unreasonable searches and
seizures in light of the truth-in-evidence provision.8 5 The court found
the "clear" intent of the truth-in-evidence provision was to restore
the supremacy of federal case law.86
The state right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
is virtually identical to the federal fourth amendment. 7 The narrow
issue in Lance was whether the rule of vicarious standing was available
to the defendant under the state unreasonable search and seizure right,
despite the truth-in-evidence provision." Under federal law, fourth
amendment rights are personal and may be asserted only by persons
75. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d at 774, 533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
76. Id.
77. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 54-77 and accompanying text.
79. Williamson, 43 Cal. 2d at 654, 276 P.2d at 594.
80. See infra notes 234-40 and accompanying text.
81. Lance, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 838, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 331.
82. Id. at 846, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 335-36.
83. CAL. CONST. art. I, §13.
84. Lance, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 844, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 847, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
87. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV (see supra note 5 for text of fourth amendment).
88. Lance, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 847-48, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 336-37.
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having a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or
the property seized.89 Absent proof of standing, under the federal
rule, the challenged evidence cannot be excluded on this basis. 90 In
light of what the court believed to be the intent of the truth-in-evidence
provision, to return supremacy to federal case law holdings concern-
ing the exclusion of evidence, 9' the court held that the prior state
vicarious exclusionary rule was subsumed under the federal fourth
amendment decisions. 92
Lance, however, is distinguishable from the proposal in this com-
ment. The federal constitution contains no express right similar to
the state constitutional right to privacy.93 Federal precedential authority
on the right to privacy is unavailable to California courts,94 unlike
the situation in Lance where the United States Supreme Court had
addressed the vicarious standing question under the fourth
amendment. 9s The Lance decision itself allowed that, in the absence
of controlling federal precedent, state courts are free to interpret the
fourth amendment in a manner consistent with the state constitution,
including the truth-in-evidence provision. 96
The same reasoning applies when a conflict arises between the right
to privacy and the truth-in-evidence provision. As previously
demonstrated, the two constitutional provisions must be read in the
context of each other. 97 When placed against each other, the specific
right to privacy will govern the general truth-in-evidence provision.98
The absence of federal authority on an express right to privacy,
therefore, allows California courts to construe the right to privacy
as an independent state ground for requiring exclusion of evidence
obtained through the warrantless use of bugged informants, despite
the truth-in-evidence provisions.99
The United States Supreme Court has considered privacy expecta-
tions in the past, but those cases involve claims of violation of fourth
amendment rights, not the right to privacy.' 0 Current California law
89. U.S. v. Payner, 44 U.S. 727, 731 (1980).
90. Id.
91. Lance, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 847, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
92. Id. at 848, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
93. See infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
94. Of course, the United States Supreme Court has considered privacy expectations in
the past, but those cases involve claims of violation of rights under the fourth amendment.
See infra notes 103-63 and accompanying text.
95. Payner, 44 U.S. at 731.
96. Lance, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 847 n.5, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 336 n.5.
97. Armstrong, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 610-11, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 301.
98. See supra notes 54-79 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 81-97 and accompanying text. Lance is on review to the California
Supreme Court.
100. See infra notes 103-63 and accompanying text.
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reflects adherence to the federal decisions considering privacy expec-
tations under fourth amendment claims.' Nonetheless, the most re-
cent California decision that follows federal precedent in a case of
the warrantless use of bugged informants was decided prior to adop-
tion of the state constitutional right to privacy." 2 Before demonstrating
how the right to privacy allows California courts to provide greater
protections against electronic surveillance, an examination of prior
federal holdings is necessary to establish a base from which to begin
the analysis.
EARLY CASES AND United States v. White
Federal case law holds that a search warrant is not required under
the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures when incriminating evidence is obtained from a defendant
in conversations with a trusted colleague who is in fact a government
agent.'0 3 Also, a search warrant is not required when the defendant
unknowingly gives information to a person who is secretly a govern-
ment agent."' Furthermore, early cases held that no constitutional
violation occurred when these same agents recorded'09 or contem-
poraneously transmitted'0 6 conversations, unbeknownst to the defen-
dant, without a warrant.
One of these early cases, On Lee v. United States,'07 involved the
monitoring of a defendant's conversation with an acquaintance who
was a bugged informer.' 0' The conversation was transmitted to an
agent located outside the area.'0 9 The Court, in adhering to
precedent," ' held that surveillance without any trespass fell outside
the ambit of the Constitution."' No trespass was committed because
consent from the defendant to the informer's entry had been obtained
by fraud."12 Additionally, no trespass occurred when an agent out-
side the area electronically monitored the conversation inside.'
101. See infra notes 164-77 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
103. Hoffa v. U.S., 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
104. Lewis v. U.S., 385 U.S. 206, 212 (1966).
105. Lopez, 373 U.S. at 439.
106. On Lee v. U.S., 343 U.S. 747, 752-53 (1952).
107. Id. at 747.
108. Id. at 749.
109. Id.
110. Goldman v. U.S., 316 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1942); Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 457,
464 (1928).
111. On Lee, 343 U.S. at 753-54.
112. Id. at 752.
113. Id.
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The trespass doctrine relied upon in On Lee subsequently was over-
ruled in Katz v. United States."4 Katz held that the proper test to
determine fourth amendment protections is not whether a defendant
is in a "constitutionally protected area,""' 5 but whether his privacy,
upon which he justifiably relied, had been violated. 16 The trespass
doctrine was no longer controlling." ' Furthermore, Katz rejected the
argument made by the government that electronic surveillance was
exempted from the usual requirement of advance authorization by
a magistrate upon a showing of probable cause." 8
Katz was the first case to hold that fourth amendment protection
cannot turn on the presence or absence of physical intrusion into a
given area." 9 In that case, federal agents attached an electronic listening
and recording device to the outside of a telephone booth.'20 The agents
overheard the defendant's end of conversations when he placed calls
from the booth, and his incriminating statements later were- used at
trial to secure his conviction for violating a federal statute prohibiting
the transmission of wagering information by telephone.' 2' The defen-
dant's objection to the use of the evidence on the ground that it had
been obtained without a search warrant in violation of the fourth
amendment was overruled by the trial court.'22
The federal court of appeals upheld the trial court decision and
affirmed the conviction since no physical intrusion into the area had
occurred.' 23 The Supreme Court rejected this formulation of the
issue. 124,
For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a per-
son knowingly exposes to the public ... is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection... But what he seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.125
The Court held that the agents' actions violated the privacy on which
the defendant justifiably relied.' 26 Their intrusion into the defendant's
114. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
115. Id. at 351.
116. Id. at 353.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 358.
119. Id. at 353.
120. Id. at 348.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 354, 356, 358.
123. Id. at 349.
124. Id. at 350.
125. Id. at 351-52.
126. Id. at 353.
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privacy thus constituted a search and seizure under the fourth
amendment. 127 Since no warrant was obtained 12 and none of the well-
established exceptions to the warrant requirement had been met,129
the search was unreasonable. 3 Furthermore, the Court found that
requiring a warrant under these circumstances does not impinge upon
the legitimate needs of law enforcement.' 3
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion sets forth the dual require-
ment that must be met to garner fourth amendment protection. 32
A person must exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy and the
expectation must be objectively recognizable by society as reasonable. '
Justice Harlan's frequently quoted explanation of the majority opin-
ion in Katz has since become the "touchstone of the constitutional
right of privacy as against surreptitious governmental
eavesdropping."' 34 An analysis of White, however, will show how
the Katz principles were limited when evidence was obtained through
the warrantless use of a bugged informant.'
The facts in White were nearly identical to those in On Lee. 36 An
informer was outfitted with a transmitter to allow government agents
to overhear conversations with the defendant without first obtaining
a warrant.'3 7 The plurality in White accepted the fact that On Lee
was overruled by Katz, 3 but only to the extent that Katz held fourth
amendment violations do not depend on whether a trespass had
occurred.' 39 The discussion in White concerning the effect of Katz
on On Lee appears to limit the possible sweep of Katz merely to over-
ruling prior cases that required physical intrusion before a fourth
amendment violation could be found.'4 0
The court of appeals in White, however, had interpreted Katz as
127. Id.
128. Id. at 356.
129. Id. at 357, 362 (Harlan, J., concurring); see, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
298-300 (1967) (hot pursuit warrantless entry); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61-62 (1967)
(search of lawfully impounded automobile); Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 174-77 (1949)
(nonrandom roadblock search); McDonald v. U.S., 335 U.S. 451, 454-56 (1948) (invalid search
since not within exception); Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, 153, 156 (1925) (search incident
to arrest).
130. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
131. Id. at 356.
132. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
133. Id.
134. Robinson v. Superior Court, 105 Cal. App. 3d 249, 255, 164 Cal. Rptr. 389, 392 (1980).
135. White, 401 U.S. at 750.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 746-47.
138. Id. at 750.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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completely overruling On Lee.14' The court of appeals held that fourth
amendment violations are not dependent upon trespass notions,' 42 and
furthermore, evidence obtained by warrantless electronic eavesdropp-
ing was inadmissible. ' 3 The Supreme Court plurality in White re-
jected the second part of that holding.'4 4
Justice White, writing for the plurality, refused to find a constitu-
tionally justifiable expectation of privacy in warrantless recording or
transmission of conversations.'" He reasoned that since the law per-
mits intrusion upon expectations of privacy when a trusted colleague
verbally reports back to the authorities,'4 6 no different result should
obtain when the same agent records or transmits the conversation.'"
In terms of the risk involved in either situation, the plurality refused
to distinguish informers from informers with recorders. 4 The justices
reasoned that the argument that a defendant's statements would be
substantially different if he suspected that the person with whom he
was conversing was wired for sound was only speculation. 149
Interestingly, the situation in White was distinguished from Katz
since Katz did not involve revelations to the government by a party
to the conversation. 5 In essence, Katz held that obtaining evidence
by the warrantless attachment of an electronic device to a telephone
booth, where a person expects privacy, is unreasonable.'' Despite
this determination, White held that the warrantless attachment of a
similar device to an informer, to gain incriminating information from
a conversation that a person likewise expects is private, is reasonable.'1 2
The dispositive fact for the Court appears to have been the presence
or absence of a conniving participant to the conversation.' 3
The dissenters in White, unlike the plurality, stated that the court
of appeals had correctly interpreted Katz as completely overruling On
141. Id.
142. Id. at 748-49.
143. Id. at 747, 750.
144. Id. at 750.
145. Id. at 752-53.
146. See Hoffa, 385 U.S. 302 (trusted colleague really an informer); Lewis, 385 U.S. at
212 (undercover agent); Lopez, 373 U.S. at 439 (informer's recording).
147. White, 401 U.S. at 752.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 749. Katz did not involve an informer wired for sound, but rather the listening
and recording by federal agents of calls in a telephone booth. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
151. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
152. White, 401 U.S. at 752.
153. Id. at 750; see Katz, 389 U.S at 354 nn.14, 15. The agents preserved only the defen-
dant's end of the conversations and on the one occasion that another person's statements were
intercepted, the agents "refrained from listening." Id.
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Lee."', Justice Douglas, dissenting in White, maintained that the core
of the decision in On Lee was the early common-law notions of
trespass.' 55 These notions were specifically rejected in Katz.' 56 Fur-
thermore, according to Justice Douglas, Katz emphasized that with
few exceptions "searches conducted outside the judicial process
...are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.... 1 57
Justices Harlan and Marshall, also dissenting in White, similarly con-
cluded that On Lee can no longer be regarded as sound law in light
of the constitutional principles articulated in Katz.' 58
In summary, Katz directed fourth amendment search and seizure
analysis away from rigid trespass and property notions to the more
flexible approach of determining when a reasonable expectation of
privacy exists.'" 9 In overruling On Lee, Katz also established that a
warrant is required for electronic surveillance'60 which does not impinge
upon the needs of law enforcement. 6' White, however, rejected by
a mere plurality the notion that evidence obtained by warrantless elec-
tronic eavesdropping is inadmissible.' 62 Most states, including
California, 63 have adopted the view of the plurality in White, despite
Katz. An examination of the use of bugged informants in California
will reveal that current case law does not reflect a consideration of
the state right to privacy.
CAtnioRmA: People v. Murphy
In People v. Murphy, the government intercepted and recorded the
defendant's conversation by means of a transmitting device concealed
in the clothing of his brother, a police informer.'64 The defendant
contended his fourth amendment rights had been violated by the war-
rantless electronic surveillance, citing Katz for the proposition that
his reasonable expectations of privacy had been intruded upon.'6 5 The
court rejected this contention and maintained that Katz only protects
154. White, 401 U.S. at 747; see also Dancy v. U.S., 390 F.2d 370, 371 (5th Cir. 1968)
(considering On Lee viable despite Katz).
155. White, 401 U.S. at 759, 760-61 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
156. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, 353.
157. White, 401 U.S. at 761 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357).
158. Id. at 769 (Harlan, J., dissenting), 796 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
159. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
162. White, 401 U.S. at 750; see supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
163. People v. Murphy, 8 Cal. 3d 349, 360, 503 P.2d 594, 601, 105 Cal. Rptr. 138, 145,
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 833 (1973).
164. Id. at 354, 503 P.2d at 597, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
165. Id. at 358, 503 P.2d at 600, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
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persons from the uninvited ear.'66 The judges could perceive no distinc-
tion between informants verbally reporting conversations and infor-
mants recording or transmitting conversations. 67 Apparently, the court
drew support for this position from the distinction set out in White
between the attachment of an electronic device to a telephone booth
and the attachment of the device to an informer to monitor a
conversation.' 6 The court held that Katz does not protect against a
breach of trust by a party to a conversation. 69
Significantly, Murphy was decided in November 1972, the same
month during which California voters amended the state constitution
to provide explicit protection for every individual's privacy interest.' °
The defendant in Murphy did not argue that his right to privacy under
the California Constitution had been violated' 7' because the case was
decided before the amendment was adopted by the voters. 1 2 The
California right to privacy offers protection from government
surveillance and data collecting activities.' 73 Since Murphy was based
on the federal case of White'74 and preceded this state constitutional
protection,' 75 a mechanism now exists with which to reject White.
Two other jurisdictions have rejected White'7 6 based on protections
offered under their state constitutions.'77 A discussion of cases con-
cerning bugged informants in Michigan and Alaska follows to show
how and why these states have rejected White.
166. Id. at 358-59, 503 P.2d at 600-01, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45; see Katz, 389 U.S. at
352. Defendant in telephone booth who shuts door and pays toll for call seeks to exclude
the uninvited ear. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
167. Murphy, 8 Cal. 3d at 354, 503 P.2d at 601, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
168. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
169. Murphy, 8 Cal. 3d at 358-59, 503 P.2d at 600-01, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45.
170. CAL. CONST. art. I, §1 (reworded by constitutional amendment 1974).
171. See generally Murphy, 8 Cal. 3d at 358, 503 P.2d at 600, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 144. Defen-
dant contended his fourth amendment rights had been violated. Id.
172. Gerstein, California's Constitutional Right to Privacy: The Development of the Pro-
tection of Private Life, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 385, 402 (1982). The proposed amendment
appeared in the California Voter Pamphlet of November 7, 1982, but was not adopted until
after the Murphy trial court sustained a demurrer. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 773-75
n.8, 533 P.2d 222, 233-34 n.8, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 105 n.8 (1975).
173. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d at 773-74, 533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
174. See supra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
176. People v. Beavers, 227 N.W.2d 511, 514 (Mich. 1975); State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872,
876 (Alaska 1978).
177. Glass, 583 P.2d at 879, 881; Beavers, 227 N.W.2d at 516; ALASKA CONST. art. 1,
§§14, 22 (protections against unreasonable searches and seizures and the right to privacy); MICH.
CoNsr. art. I, §11 (right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures). Both courts also
referred to Justice Harlan's expression of the reasonable expectation test in Katz as another
basis for their decisions. Glass, 583 P.2d at 879, 881; Beavers, 227 N.W.2d at 516.
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MICmGAN AND ALASKA REjECT White
In the Michigan case of People v. Beavers,'78 incriminating evidence,
obtained by the warrantless use of a police informant equipped with
a radio transmitter underneath his shirt, was used to convict the defen-
dant of selling heroin.'7 9 The defendant argued that Katz expanded
the right to privacy to include freedom from the uninvited monitor-
ing of a conversation thought to be private, while the State argued
that White was controlling.' 80 The Michigan Supreme Court held that
a search warrant should have been obtained before the electronic
surveillance was instituted.' 8 '
Beavers rejected the perception in White that participant monitor-
ing is a variant of the privilege of a party to repeat a conversation.'
8 2
Instead, the court adopted Justice Harlan's dissent in White that the
privilege of a person to control the extent of his communications is
paramount.'83 Beavers accepted Justice Harlan's distinction between
the risk involved in the repetition of conversations and the risk that
a conversation is being monitored simultaneously."' The court adopted
his analysis that the critical question is whether to impose the risks
of electronic surveillance on society without at least the protection
of a warrant.' 85 After balancing the individual and governmental in-
terests against each other, Beavers concluded that "more than self-
restraint by law enforcement officials is required and at the least war-
rants should be necessary."186 Furthermore, referring to the language
in Katz,'87 Beavers reasoned that a party speaking in private has not
"knowingly exposed this conversation to the public" merely because
an unknown party is secretly hearing every word.' 88
The holding in Beavers was based on the protection offered by the
Michigan Constitution against unreasonable searches and seizures.' 89
178. 227 N.W.2d 511.
179. Id. at 512.
180. Id. at 513.
181. Id. at 514.
182. Id.
183. See generally White, 401 U.S. at 792-93 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that
the burden is on the government to justify this intrusion, which by its very nature is broad
in scope).
184. Beavers, 227 N.W.2d at 515; see White, 401 U.S. at 777, 787 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Electronic monitoring may smother the spontaneity of speech since words would be measured
a good deal more carefully and communication inhibited. White, 401 U.S. at 777, 787 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
185. Beavers, 227 N.W.2d at 515; White, 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
186. Beavers, 227 N.W.2d at 515-16; White, 401 U.S. at 786-87 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
187. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
188. Beavers, 227 N.W.2d at 515 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).
189. Id. at 516. The decision was based on article 1, §11 of the Michigan Constitution,
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Michigan, like other jurisdictions, has a tradition of interpreting the
state constitution as affording more protections than those required
by the United State Supreme Court in interpretations of the federal
constitution.19 Michigan, therefore, interpreted the state right to
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures more broadly than
the interpretation of the analogous fourth amendment provision in
White.' 9'
The United States Constitution does not contain an express
right to privacy.' 92 Various Bill of Rights provisions have been held
applicable to the states via the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, including the fourth amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 193 Some of the specific guarantees
of the Bill of Rights have penumbra that create zones of privacy 94
in matters of marriage, childbearing, religion, housing, or education. 95
The protection of a general right to privacy, however, is left largely
to the law of the individual states. 96 Alaska, which has a state con-
stitutional right to privacy, rejected White on this basis.' 97 An
examination of the treatment of bugged informants under the Alaska
right to privacy follows.
In the Alaska case of State v. Glass, a police informer was out-
fitted with a transmitting device that allowed government agents to
overhear a conversation between the informer and the defendant. 98
The evidence secretly obtained without a warrant later was used to
try to convict the defendant of selling heroin.'99 At trial, the defen-
dant argued that the use of his incriminating statements violated his
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under both the
United States and Alaska Constitutions,200 and his right to privacy
under the Alaska Constitution.20 ' The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed
which is virtually identical to the fourth amendment protection of the United States Constitu-
tion. Id.
190. Note, Third-Party Participant Monitoring Constitutes a Search and Seizure Which Can
Be Justified Only If a Valid Search Warrant Is Issued, 45 U. Cn4. L. REv. 133, 137 n.31 (1976).
191. Beavers, 227 N.W.2d at 516.
192. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
193. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
194. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
195. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
196. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-51.
197. Glass, 583 P.2d at 879 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-51); AiAsKA CoNsT. art. I, §22.
198. Glass, 583 P.2d at 874.
199. Id.
200. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV; ALAsKA Co NsT. art. 1, §14.
201. ALAsKA CONST. art. I, §22.
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the grant of the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence by the
superior court on the basis of the state right to privacy.
20 2
While the prosecutor relied upon federal decisions dealing with the
fourth amendment,2"3 the court expressly stated that it was not bound
by them. 20 4 Although careful consideration must be given to the deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court,20 3 the protection of a general
right to privacy is left largely to the law of the individual states. z°
The court found that the federal case authority was questionable and
unpersuasive as to construction of the analogous provision in the
Alaska Constitution against unreasonable searches and seizures.20 7
Furthermore, federal authority was not determinative of the scope
of the state right to privacy since that right is not contained in the
United States Constitution.2 8
Glass distinguished the risk that a participant secretly is recording
or transmitting a conversation from the risk that conversations thought
to be confidential will be repeated. 20 9 The Glass court concluded that
a substantial difference exists between the risk of betrayal by oral
recollection and the risk that remarks are being secretly recorded or
broadcast.21 0 Mere repetition of confidences to third parties requires
a consideration by them of the speaker's credibility and memory.2'
By contrast, preservation of ill-considered and thoughtless remarks
on tape eliminates the buffer of considerations of credibility and
memory that exist with reported conversation, especially since the
remarks may be the product of clever prodding.21 2 The sole available
alternative to speakers is silence.2"3 Glass found that this rationale
202. Glass, 583 P.2d at 882.
203. Id. at 874.
204. Id. at 876. The court cited numerous examples of cases construing the Alaska Con-
stitution as affording additional rights to those offered under the United States Constitution.
Id. at 876 n.12.
205. Id. at 876.
206. Id. at 879 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-51).
207. Id. at 874-75.
208. Id. at 875.
209. Id.; see also White, 401 U.S. at 777 (Harlan, J., dissenting). "[I]t is ...quite a
different matter to foist upon him the risk that an unknown party may be simultaneously listening
in." White, 401 U.S. at 777 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
210. Glass, 583 P.2d at 877; see White, 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting). We must
examine the "desirability of saddling" this risk on society "without at least the protection
of a warrant." White, 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
211. Glass, 583 P.2d at 878.
212. Id. at 877-78; see White, 401 U.S. at 787-88 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Having to con-
tend with a documented record of a conversation may well smother that spontaneity of discourse
that "liberates daily life." White, 401 U.S. at 787-88 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
213. Glass, 583 P.2d at 877-78; White, 401 U.S. at 787-88 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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from the dissents in White led to the conclusion that a warrant was
required to prevent the smothering of spontaneous discourse.2' 4
Glass relied upon an even more compelling reason, however, for
rejecting White.2"5 The court based the decision on the state constitu-
tional right to privacy,2" 6 and held that the defendant's privacy right
was violated when the police used an informer outfitted with a
transmitting device to obtain evidence without first procuring a
warrant.21 7 The court reasoned that the provision offered broader pro-
tection than penumbral rights sometimes inferred from other constitu-
tional provisions.2"'
As previously mentioned, a penumbral right to privacy emanates
from certain specific Bill of Rights provisions.2 '9 When a state has
taken the step of creating a specific constitutional right to privacy,
the right must be viewed as offering greater protection than the federal
penumbral zones of privacy. 220 Otherwise, no reason would exist to
amend the state constitution to include a right to privacy. 221
The Glass court was faced with an absence of recorded legislative
history of the state right to privacy. 222 The court, however, found
analogous provisions recently enacted in other states helpful in con-
struing the scope of the Alaska right to privacy. 23 For example, Hawaii
had amended the state constitution to provide against invasions of
privacy. 224 In State v. Roy, 225 the Hawaii Supreme Court determined
that the purpose of the amendment was to protect against extensive
governmental use of electronic surveillance devices. 226 Glass concluded
that the Alaska privacy amendment similarly prohibited electronic
monitoring of conversations upon the mere consent of a participant. 227
In defining privacy, Glass adopted Justice Harlan's two-pronged Katz
test of reasonable expectations of privacy 22a and held that the state
214. Glass, 583 P.3d at 878; see also While, 401 U.S. at 762-63 (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(spontaneous speech not free when electronic surveillance is involved), 876-87 (Harlan, J., dissen-
ting) (concern for preserving spontaneity of speech).
215. Glass, 583 P.2d at 878.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 879.
219. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
220. Glass, 583 P.2d at 879.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 878-79.
223. Id. at 879.
224. HAwA-I CONsT. art. I, §6 (amended 1978).
225. 510 P.2d 1066 (Hawaii 1973).
226. Id. at 1068-69.
227. Glass, 583 P.2d at 879. Significantly, the court also relied on the interpretation in
White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d at 773, 533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105 of the California
right to privacy. Id.
228. Id. at 875.
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right to privacy protected individuals from surveillance and data col-
lecting activities.22 9
In summary, Michigan and Alaska have rejected White under pro-
tections offered under their state constitutions.23 Both states have
held that a warrant is required before law enforcement officials can
use bugged informants. 3 ' The Alaska Constitution contains a right
to privacy that is similar to the California right to privacy. 2 Further-
more, Alaska has demonstrated that the state right to privacy is an
appropriate vehicle for'imposing a warrant requirement for electronic
surveillance.233 An analysis of the California right to privacy will
demonstrate that the same approach is available to California for re-
jecting White and requiring a warrant for the use of bugged
informants.
CALIFORNIA RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The proposal of a warrant requirement under the California right
to privacy prior to the commencement of electronic surveillance will
include the following steps. First, the author will examine the ability
of California courts to recognize greater protections for citizens than
those offered under the federal constitution. This discussion will in-
clude a reiteration of the above conclusion that the author's proposal
and the truth-in-evidence section of Proposition 8 may co-exist. Second,
the purpose of the California constitutional amendment will be ex-
plored through analysis of case law interpreting the right to privacy.
Third, a comparison will be made of two different approaches for
determining whether the right to privacy has been violated. Finally,
the relationship between the state Penal Code sections aimed at preven-
ting invasions of privacy and the constitutional right to privacy will
reveal the breadth of the proposed protection under the state
constitution.
Initially, consideration must be given to the state power to impose
higher standards than those required by the federal constitution.3
229. Id. at 879.
230. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
231. Beavers, 227 N.W.2d at 516; Glass, 583 P.2d at 877-78. See generally White, 401 U.S.
at 768-95 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stressing necessity of warrant for electronic surveillance of
conversations).
232. ALASKA CONST. art. I, §22; CAl. CoNST. art. I, §1.
233. See supra notes 183-88, 215-29 and accompanying text.
234. People v. Pettingill, 21 Cal. 3d 231, 247, 578 P.2d 108, 118, 145 Cal. Rptr. 861, 871
(1978); People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 115, 545 P.2d 272, 281, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 369
(1976); People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 548, 531 P.2d 1099, 1111-12, 119 Cal. Rptr.
315, 328 (1975); 6 WrrKIN, CAuiFoRaiA PROCEDURE, Appeal, 674 (2d ed. 1971).
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California state courts are the ultimate arbiters of state law unless
their interpretations purport to restrict liberties guaranteed under the
federal constitution."' As previously demonstrated, the Proposition
8 truth-in-evidence provision seeks to restore supremacy to federal
decisions concerning exclusion of evidence.236 The absence of an ex-
press federal right to privacy, 2" however, allows California courts
to interpret the state right to privacy in a manner consistent with
other state constitutional provisions bearing on the same subject.238
United States Supreme Court decisions, however, still are entitled
to careful consideration and should be followed unless persuasive
reasons exist to follow a different course.239 The state constitutional
right to privacy is a persuasive reason to reject White and impose
a warrant requirement in a manner consistent with the intent of Pro-
position 8 to provide aid to victims of violent crime. 240 The purpose
of the right to privacy amendment and interpretations in case law,
as set out below, will demonstrate that the provision was intended
to encompass the proposed protection.
The California Constitution was amended in November 1972 to in-
clude the right to privacy among the various inalienable rights of all
people. 2' White v. Davis24 2 was the first major California case to
interpret the state constitutional right to privacy. In that case, police
officers, posing as students, enrolled in a university and covertly re-
corded class discussions.24 3 The officers compiled police dossiers and
filed "intelligence" reports although these reports did not pertain to
illegal activities.2 '4 A professor filed a complaint alleging a violation
of the state constitutional right to privacy. 245 The court held that the
plaintiffs had alleged a prima facie violation of the right to privacy. 246
Although White v. Davis did not deal with the specific problem of
235. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d at 548, 531 P.2d at 1112, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
236. Lance, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 847, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
237. -1d. at 847 n.5, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 336 n.5.
238. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
239. People v. Teresinski, 30 Cal. 3d 822, 836, 640 P.2d 753, 761, 180 Cal. Rptr. 617,
625 (1982). The court stated it lacked reasons to justify rejecting under state law a unanimous,
uncriticized decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. Id.
240. CAL. CoNsr. art. I, §28(a).
241. Id., §1. As amended in November 1974, the provision now reads: "All persons are
by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." Id.
242. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d at 757, 533 P.2d at 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
243. Id. at 760, 533 P.2d at 224, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 761-62, 533 P.2d at 225, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
246. Id. at 760, 533 P.2d at 224, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
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bugged informants,247 the case is significant to the proposal of this
comment because it established that surveillance and data collecting
activities fall within the aegis of the right to privacy.245
The right to privacy provision was motivated by concern for ac-
celerating encroachment on personal freedom, security, and privacy
by increased surveillance and data collecting activities of government
and business. 249 The primary purpose of the provision is to afford
individuals some measure of protection against the threat to personal
privacy. 2" This purpose is set out clearly in a statement drafted by
the proponents of the provision and included in the state ballot
pamphlet. 251 "This amendment creates a legal and enforceable right
of privacy for every Californian. . . .The right of privacy is . . .
a fundamental and compelling interest. . . .This right should be
abridged only when there is a compelling public need. .. .252
The language in the ballot pamphlet indicates that the burden is
on the government to justify an intrusion into privacy by a compell-
ing need.253 Some state courts, however, by relying on the Katz prin-
ciples, have placed the burden on a defendant to show that a
reasonable expectation of privacy existed at the time the conversation
was recorded.254 An analysis of these two approaches will reveal that
the burden should be on the government to prove that a compelling
need justifies the intrusion by electronic surveillance in the absence
of a warrant.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 773, 533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
249. Id. at 774, 533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
250. Id.
251. Id. California decisions have recognized the propriety of resorting to ballot pamphlet
arguments as an aid in construing legislative measures and constitutional amendments adopted
pursuant to a vote of the people. See, e.g., Carter v. Commission, 14 Cal. 2d 179, 185, 93
P.2d 140, 144 (1939).
252. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d at 774-75, 533 P.2d at 233-34, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105-06.
The proliferation of government snooping and data collecting is threatening to destroy
our traditional freedoms .... At present there are no effective restrains on the infor-
mation gathering activities of government and business. This amendment creates a
legal and enforceable right of privacy for every Californian.... The right of privacy
is the right to be left alone. It is a fundamental and compelling interest. It protects
our homes, our families, our thoughts, our emotions, our expressions, our personalities,
our freedom of communion and our freedom to associate with the people we choose.
It prevents government and business from collecting and stockpiling unnecessary in-
formation about us and from misusing information. . . .Fundamental to our privacy
is the ability to control circulation of personal information. . . .Often we do not
know that these records even exist. . . .Even more dangerous is the loss of control
over the accuracy of government and business records of individuals. . . .This right
should be abridged only when there is a compelling public need. . ..
Id.
253. Id.
254. See infra notes 257-62 and accompanying text.
1077
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 15
The compelling need approach is demonstrated by White v. Davis
in which the court focused on the nature of the government activity,
rather than on the individual whose right was violated.2" The court
emphasized that an intrusion into personal privacy must be justified
by a compelling interest.256 Commentators therefore have argued that
reasonable expectation analysis has no place in decisions concerning
the right to privacy257 since that shifts the burden of proof from the
government to the defendant. 258
The California Supreme Court, however, drawing from Justice
Harlan's two-pronged Katz test, added reasonable expectation analysis
to subsequent cases alleging a violation of the right to privacy. 2 9 The
courts in these cases have maintained that the constitutional right of
privacy was designed to protect confidential communications.26 The
proper test is whether the person whose conversation was recorded
had a reasonable expectation of privacy at the time of the recording.26'
This was the approach in the Alaska case of Glass, in which the court
adopted Justice Harlan's Katz test.262 Although some California courts
have taken the approach that puts the burden on the defendant to show
that a reasonable expectation of privacy existed at the time of the
recording,263 the better standard, in light of the ballot pamphlet
language264 and White v. Davis,265 would appear to be whether the
government can prove a compelling public need justified the
instrusion. 266
The interpretation of the California right to privacy, therefore, dif-
fers from the Alaska approach in this respect. Another considera-
tion, however, is the Invasion of Privacy Act contained in the Califor-
255. Gerstein, supra note 172, at 404.
256. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d at 775, 533 P.2d at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
257. See generally Gerstein, supra note 172, at 411-13. It is not the expectation, but the
"character of the need for privacy" that justifies the protection. Id.
258. Id. at 413.
259. Id. at 408.
260. North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 309, 502 P.2d 1305, 1309, 104 Cal. Rptr.
833, 837 (1972); People v. Newton, 42 Cal. App. 3d 292, 296, 116 Cal. Rptr. 690, 693, cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 937 (1975). One under arrest, in police custody in a patrol car, has no reasonable
expectation of privacy that the conversation will not be recorded. Newton, 42 Cal. App. 3d
at 296, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 693, cert. denied, 420 U.S. 937.
261. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
262. Glass, 583 P.2d at 875.
263. See supra notes 260-61 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
265. Gerstein, supra note 172, at 404.
266. See supra notes 252-56 and accompanying text.
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nia Penal Code.26 7 A discussion of this statutory scheme, directed at
eavesdropping by means of electronic devices, will demonstrate that
the proposed protection under the constitutional right to privacy is
broader than the protection offered under the statutes.
Section 632 of the Penal Code provides that every person who
eavesdrops on or records a confidential communication without the
consent of all parties shall be subject to punishment by fine, imprison-
ment, or both.2 68 Furthermore, evidence obtained as a result of
unlawful recording or eavesdropping upon a confidential communica-
tion shall be inadmissible in any judicial, administrative, legislative,
or other proceeding.2 69 A literal reading of section 632 indicates that
any governmental use of electronic surveillance is impossible since a
defendant, a party to a conversation, would never consent.2 7° This
would obviate the need for the proposal in this comment, however,
the history of the act and case law show the proposed protection
is not offered by the sections.27'
Section 632 was derived from former section 653j.272 Under that
section, the use of devices for eavesdropping upon or recording con-
fidential communications was forbidden in certain situations .273 The
purpose of the former section 653j, however, was to supplement the
wiretapping statute embodied in section 631 of the Penal Code.274
Section 631 prohibits an unauthorized connection to a telephone wire
to obtain the contents of a conversation while it is passing over a
telephone line. 27" Former section 653j was enacted to cover the situa-
tion of recording a telephone conversation after it had reached the
intended recipient." 6
Recent cases do not indicate that the Penal Code sections cover
the use of bugged informants.277 In fact, the courts have relied on
267. CAL. PENAL. CODE §§630-637.5.
268. Id. §632a.
269. Id. §632d.
270. Id. §632a.
271. See infra notes 272-86 and accompanying text.
272. CAL. PENAL CODE §653j (former section enacted in 1963).
273. Id.
274. Id §631 (derived from former section 640).
275. Id.
276. People v. Fontaine, 237 Cal. App. 2d 320, 332, 46 Cal. Rptr. 855, 864, vacated 386
U.S. 263, adopted in part on remand, 252 Cal. App. 2d 173, 60 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1967), rehear-
ing denied, 391 U.S. 292 (1968); cf. People v. La Peluso, 239 Cal. App. 2d 715, 723-24, 49
Cal. Rptr. 85, 90 (1966). The statute is inapplicable with the consent of a party. La Peluso,
239 Cal. App. 2d at 723-24, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
277. See supra notes 272-76 and accompanying text.
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the reasoning of earlier cases"' that the statutes are not violated when
one party to the conversation consents to electronic monitoring. 279
Other cases involve special factual circumstances that prevent analysis
on the precise question of what protections are available against govern-
mental use of electronic surveillance under the statutes.280 For exam-
ple, the detainee cases measure the protection in terms of reasonable
expectations of privacy."8 ' California case law consistently holds that
a person who is a detainee at the time a conversation is recorded
has no reasonable expectation of privacy.282 The question of whether
a violation of the statute has occurred, therefore, is not directly
addressed.283
The language of section 632 indicates that a remedy to intrusions
into privacy through the use of bugged informants already may exist. 284
The history of this act and case law treatment, however, indicates
that the Penal Code sections do not provide adequate protection against
the use of bugged informants.8 5 The protection, therefore, must be
sought under the constitutional right to privacy.28 6
In summary, California is able to grant greater protections under
the state constitution than those offered under the federal constitu-
tion despite adoption of the truth-in-evidence section of Proposition
8.287 The purpose of the right to privacy amendment is to protect
against invasions of privacy through the use of electronic surveillance
in the absence of a compelling public need. 288 Existing Penal Code
sections aimed at guarding against invasions of privacy are not broad
enough to apply to the warrantless use of bugged informants. 89
Because of these three factors, California should reject White under
the state constitutional right to privacy and impose a warrant require-
ment on the use of bugged informants. One remaining concern,
278. La Peluso, 239 Cal. App. 2d at 723-24, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 90; Fontaine, 237 Cal. App.
2d at 332, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 864; People v. Albert, 182 Cal. App. 2d 729, 739, 6 Cal. Rptr.
473, 478 (1960); People v. Wojahn, 169 Cal. App. 2d 135, 142-43, 337 P.2d 192, 196 (1959);
cf. Glass, 583 P.2d at 878. Under the state right to privacy, mere consent of one party to
the conversation does not prevent a finding that the right was violated. Id.
279. People v. Montgomery, 61 Cal. App. 3d 718, 732, 132 Cal. Rptr. 558, 567 (1976);
Fontaine, 237 Cal. App. 2d at 332, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
280. See infra notes 281-83 and accompanying text.
281. North, 8 Cal. 3d at 308-09, 502 P.2d at 1309, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. See supra notes 268-70 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 268-86 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 272-76 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 25-102, 234-40 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 268-86 and accompanying text.
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however, is the effect of the proposed warrant requirement on law
enforcement. A discussion of the individual and governmental or
societal interests involved will reveal that a warrant requirement im-
poses no significant burden on law enforcement.
ANALYSIS OF INTERESTS
In Glass, the Alaska Supreme Court perceived that the meaning
of privacy will vary depending on the factual context and the com-
peting individual and societal interests.29 The nature of the particular
police practice and the extent of the impact on individual interests
must be balanced against the utility of the conduct as a law enforce-
ment technique. 29' The assessment of the individual and governmen-
tal interests which follows demonstrates that a warrant is necessary
for electronic monitoring because of encroachments on privacy made
possible by modern technology.292
Participant monitoring is a vitally important investigative tool of
law enforcement. 293 Equally significant, however, is the security en-
joyed by persons who know that the risk of intrusion by means of
electronic surveillance devices is subject to constitutional protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 9 Courts have the duty
to maintain the precious balance between individual freedom and
privacy, and the law enforcement needs of the state.9
As a practical matter, evidence of certain crimes, due to their
clandestine nature, may be obtained only through the use of informers
or electronic surveillance devices. 296 This is relevant to the propriety
of imposing an additional burden on law enforcement officers to take
the time necessary to procure a warrant.297 Nevertheless, failure to
seek a warrant prior to commencing electronic surveillance is
inexcusable.2 98 As in other search and seizure contexts, an exigent cir-
290. Glass, 583 P.2d at 879-880; see White, 401 U.S. at 772 (Harlan, J., dissenting). "[T]he
courts should proceed with specially measured steps" in striking a constitutional balance be-
tween the public and private interests at stake. White, 401 U.S. at 772 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
291. White, 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
292. Courtney, supra note 1, at 7.
293. Glass, 583 P.2d at 880; Beavers, 227 N.W.2d at 515.
294. Beavers, 227 N.W.2d at 515.
295. Comment, The Fourth Amendment, Electronic Eavesdropping and The Invasion of
Privacy, 17 S.D.L. REv. 238, 250 (1972).
296. Glass. 583 P.2d at 880; see White, 401 U.S. at 770 n.3 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting
A. WVasTiN, PRrVAcY Aim FREEDOM 131 (1967) (discussing "political" crimes, extortion, con-
spiracy, narcotics and similar crimes)).
297. White, 401 U.S. at 760 (Douglas, J., dissenting), 770 n.3 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting
A. NVEsT/N, PRIVACy AND FREEDOM 131 (1967)); Glass, 583 P.2d at 880.
298. White, 401 U.S. at 760 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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cumstances exception to the warrant requirement will ease the burden
on law enforcement officers operating in situations of extreme
urgency.2 99 The argument that a warrant requirement will result in
inefficient law enforcement, therefore, is unjustified. 00
Opponents also maintain that use of an electronic recording of in-
criminating evidence produces a more reliable version of what a defen-
dant has said than the unaided memory.3" ' In Glass, the Alaska
Supreme Court addressed this issue.30 2 Evidence is not excluded at
trial because of the extent to which it is unreliable. 3  Evidence is
excluded, however, when the values preserved by constitutional
guarantees are of greater societal concern than the use of that evidence
to obtain a conviction. 04 As in other criminal procedure contexts,
protection of constitutional rights is of higher priority than achieving
convictions based on evidence obtained in violation of those rights. 5
Assurances of self-restraint by law enforcement officials are inade-
quate to protect the values preserved by constitutional guarantees' 0 1
because of the possibility of arbitrariness. 07 Investigatory action that
impinges on privacy must be subjected to the warrant requirement
to be constitutionally permissible.30 8 The emphasis must be on
establishing in advance the circumstances that justify the intrusion
and submitting them for review to an independent assessor.30 9
The individual right to privacy has been defined as the right "to
be let alone"310 or the right to determine the extent to which infor-
mation about oneself is communicated to others."' Electronic
surveillance is the greatest leveler of human privacy ever known.3" 2
299. While, 401 U.S. at 781-84 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Among the exceptions to the war-
rant requirement are the stop and frisk cases and the administrative search cases. White, 401
U.S. at 781-84 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Glass, 583 P.2d at 881; Beavers, 227 N.W.2d at 516
n.10. Exigent circumstances also have been found when evidence might be lost if a warrantless
search were not conducted immediately, the search is made incident to a lawful arrest, or con-
ducted while in hot pursuit. Beavers, 227 N.W.2d at 516 n.10.
300. Glass, 583 P.2d at 880; Beavers, 227 N.W.2d at 515.
301. White, 401 U.S. at 753; Glass, 583 P.2d at 886 (Burke, J., dissenting); see also Lopez,
373 U.S. at 439. The argument amounts to saying a defendant is entitled to rely on flaws
in agents' memories. Lopez, 373 U.S. at 439.
302. Glass, 583 P.2d at 878..
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. White, 401 U.S. at 762 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
307. Id. at 782 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
308. Id. at 781 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
309. Note, supra note 190, at 138.
310. Glass, 583 P.2d at 880.
311. Id. at 880.
312. White, 401 U.S. at 756 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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The resulting corrosive impact from surveillance on our sense of
security and freedom of expression 31 3 poses a grave danger of chill-
ing private, free, and unconstrained communication.314
The trouble with electronic surveillance is that it is indiscriminate,
subjecting all conversation, both innocent and criminal, to official
scrutiny.3 1 A person need not be a criminal to be a victim.316 While
a warrant requirement may benefit some of the guilty, caution should
be exercised before individual rights are surrendered to the state. 311
Furthermore, the purpose of the warrant requirement is not to end
electronic surveillance, but to prevent officials from engaging in the
practice without first testing their version of the facts before a neutral
magistrate who will determine whether probable cause exists.3 19
Even conceding that indiscrete electronic surveillance would greatly
aid in the apprehension of criminals, the costs in terms of loss of
privacy far exceed the benefits, 3 9 and thus require law enforcement
officers first to obtain a warrant. 32 Courts have determined that a
judicial order authorizing the carefully limited use of electronic
surveillance can accommodate the legitimate needs of law enforce-
ment officers.321 The warrant requirement will not end electronic
surveillance, 2 ' but a neutral determination of probable cause by a
magistrate will protect individual interests from a frail exercise of self-
restraint by law enforcement officers. 3
Having established that California should reject White under the
state constitutional right to privacy2' and that a balancing of the com-
peting interests involved reveals no significant burden on law
enforcement,325 one final consideration remains. The procedural com-
ponents of the warrant requirement must be examined separately. Cer-
tain minimum standards must be met before and after authorization
of electronic surveillance is granted.
313. Glass, 583 P.2d at 877.
314. Id. (quoting Lopez, 373 U.S. at 452 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
315. White, 401 U.S. at 759-60 (Douglas, J, dissenting) (quoting Lopez, 373 U.S. at 465-66
(Brennan, J., dissenting)); Courtney, supra note 1, at 5.
316. White, 401 U.S. at 757 (Douglas, J., dissenting); People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884,
893, 506 P.2d 232, 237-38, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408, 414 (1973).
317. Comment, supra note 295, at 248.
318. White, 401 U.S. at 788-89 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Comment, supra note 295, at 249.
319. Comment, supra note 295, at 249.
320. Id.
321. Katz, 389 U.S. at 356; Comment, supra note 295, at 248.
322. Comment, supra note 295, at 249.
323. White, 401 U.S. at 782 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Beavers, 227 N.W.2d at 515; Com-
ment, supra note 295, at 249.
324. See supra notes 234-89 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 290-323 and accompanying text.
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WARRANT REQUIREMENT
The fourth amendment provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized." '3 26 Although the proposed warrant requirement seeks
to protect individual privacy, the government still must be allowed
to pursue legitimate law enforcement goals.327 California can establish
the procedural requirements for a warrant by considering those
developed by Alaska in cases following Glass,3 28 and the concept of
minimization in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968.329
As previously mentioned, Alaska has rejected White under the state
right to privacy.33 A warrant requirement was imposed under the
state constitution for electronic monitoring of private conversations. 33 '
The Alaska courts, therefore, have given considerable treatment to
the procedural components of the requirement.3 32 This persuasive treat-
ment should be used by California in setting the warrant requirement
under the right to privacy. 333
Alaska courts have determined that the affidavit presented to a
neutral magistrate must contain facts sufficient to establish probable
cause to believe criminal activity will be discovered through monitor-
ing or recording a conversation.33 This requirement is not significantly
different from the probable cause requirement of an ordinary search
warrant.3 One difference, however, is that a particularized descrip-
tion, not only of the person or thing to be seized, but also of the
place to be searched, is required for an ordinary search warrant.336
The surveillance warrant, however, must give a description, with
reasonable specificity, of the time the conversation is expected to take
place, the person or persons involved, and the subject matter of the
326. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
327. Note, "Minimizing" Interception of Innocent Communications, 53 Tut. L. REv. 264,
265 (1978) (referring to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
18 U.S.C. §§2510-2520).
328. See infra notes 330-50 and accompanying text.
329. 18 U.S.C. §§2510-2520.
330. ALAsKA CONST. art. I, §22; CAL. CONST. art. I, §1.
331. Glass, 583 P.2d at 881.
332. Id. at 881; see also id. at 881 n.36 (leaving further refinement of warrant requirement
to future cases).
333. See infra notes 334-50 and accompanying text.
334. Glass, 583 P.2d at 881; Jones v. State, 646 P.2d 243, 246 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
335. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175-76.
336. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see infra notes 346-48 and accompanying text.
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conversation. 3" The time requirement is important since the infor-
mation relied upon to establish probable cause may grow stale. 38 The
description of the person necessarily refers to the nonconsenting party,
that is, the party from whom the incriminating conversation is
sought. 39 Finally, the affidavit must set forth the incriminating mat-
ter expected to be the subject of the conversation. 34
The type of warrant involved is not one to authorize entry into
premises or a search of a person or place, but rather a warrant to
seize the conversation.3 41 In one Alaska case, the defendant challenged
the sufficiency of the affidavit for failure to describe with particularity
the place where the conversation was to occur.342 In that case, the
court held that inclusion of a description of the place was not
mandated. 343 The court reasoned that the requirement does not substan-
tially increase the protection of a person's privacy. 4  The key to
preventing a general search in this area is requiring a reasonably specific
description of the time, subject matter, and person from whom the
conversation is sought to be seized. 5
The requirements for execution of an ordinary warrant do not fit
the circumstances of recording or transmitting conversations.3 46 Usually,
officers must serve notice of lawful intrusion upon rights to
defendants. 7 While a similar need exists to give defendants notice
that their privacy rights are going to be intruded upon by electronic
surveillance, compelling reasons exist to postpone advance notice. 41
Obviously, a strict requirement that the warrant be served on the defen-
dant at the time the conversation is to be monitored would render
the technique ineffective.3 49 The rules pertaining to execution of the
warrant, therefore, must be relaxed. 3
337. Glass, 583 P.2d at 881; Jones, 646 P.2d at 247-48.
338. U.S. v. Steeves, 525 F.2d 33, 37 (8th Cir. 1975).
339. Jones, 646 P.2d at 249.
340. Id. at 248; see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967) (requiring subject matter
description); cf. Katz, 389 U.S. at 365-66 (Black, J., dissenting). He expressed doubt as to
the ability to describe a conversation that is to take place in the future. Katz, 389 U.S. at
365-66 (Black, J., dissenting).
341. Jones, 646 P.2d at 247.
342. Id. at 248; cf. 18 U.S.C. 2518 (requiring a particular description of the place).
343. Jones, 646 P.2d at 248.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 249.
347. Katz, 389 U.S. at 355 n.16; Jones, 646 P.2d at 249.
348. Jones, 646 P.2d at 249.
349. Katz, 389 U.S. at 355 n.16; Jones, 646 P.2d at 249.
350. Jones, 646 P.2d at 249.
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The Alaska cases discussed above cover the physical requirements
of the warrant which, when presented to a neutral magistrate, allow
authorization of the use of electronic surveillance.351 One remaining
consideration is how to limit what conversations may be electronical-
ly monitored under the warrant. Often, while engaged in the elec-
tronic surveillance of conversations under a previously obtained war-
rant, law enforcement officers overhear conversations, with or without
criminal implications, on matters not set forth in the warrant. Califor-
nia should consider the treatment of this issue in Title III of the Om-
nibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 which applies to
federal law enforcement agents electronically monitoring telephone
calls.352
Title III was enacted by Congress to authorize limited electronic
surveillance by the government. 3 3 The purpose of the Act is to pro-
tect individual privacy while still allowing law enforcement officers
to pursue legitimate law enforcement goals. 3 ' The act expresses the
concept of minimization in the use of electronic monitoring of
conversations. 3"1 The monitoring should involve no greater invasion
of privacy than is necessary under the circumstances. 3 6 Katz laid the
groundwork for this concept by noting that although the agents in
that case failed to procure a warrant, they did refrain from intercep-
ting conversations unrelated to their investigation. 317 Other cases have
established that the proper test is the reasonableness standard of the
fourth amendment, 311 which means that not all interceptions of con-
versations not set forth in the warrant necessarily violate
minimization. 359 The agent's duty to minimize interception of inno-
cent conversations must be measured by whether a reasonable agent
would have perceived that the conversation was nonpertinent to the
investigation. 6
The following is a summary of the procedural components of the
proposed warrant requirement under the California right to privacy.
351. See supra notes 330-50 and accompanying text.
352. 18 U.S.C. §2518.
353. Note, supra note 327, at 265.
354. Id.
355. 18 U.S.C. §2518.
356. Berger, 388 U.S. at 56; see also Note, supra note 327, at 266 (electronic monitoring
limited to conversations related to the crime under investigation).
357. Katz, 389 U.S. at 354 n.15.
358. U.S. v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1047 (D. Md.), aff'd sub nom, U.S. v. Gior-
dano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
359. U.S. v. Falcone, 364 F. Supp. 877, 886 (D. N.J. 1973), aff'd. mem., 500 F.2d 1401
(3d Cir. 1974).
360. Note, supra note 327, at 265.
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The affidavit must contain facts sufficient to establish probable cause
to monitor conversations electronically.3 6' The affidavit must describe
with particularity the time and subject matter of the conversation,
and the party from whom the conversation is sought to be seized.3 62
A duly qualified magistrate could then constitutionally authorize this
limited search and seizure of a conversation.363 Finally, the officers
must exercise caution to protect against a greater invasion of privacy
than is necessary under the circumstances.36 '
CONCLUSION
The author proposes that California courts should adopt a warrant
requirement under the state constitutional right to privacy prior to
the use of electronic surveillance, specifically the use of bugged in-
formants. As demonstrated, the truth-in-evidence section of Proposi-
tion 8 does not bar California courts from excluding evidence ob-
tained through the warrantless use of electronic surveillance when the
evidence is challenged under the specific state right to privacy
guarantee. An examination of federal cases reveals no impediment
to California providing greater protections to persons against the use
of electronic surveillance.
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court overruled the trespass
doctrine and directed search and seizure analysis to a determination
of whether a reasonable expectation of privacy existed. Once the sub-
jective and objective components of this expectation are established,
a warrant must have been obtained prior to intrusion by law enforce-
ment officers. The case of United States v. White, however, limited
Katz to overruling the trespass doctrine. Despite strong dissents main-
taining that electronic surveillance is not a variation of the privilege
to repeat conversations, the White plurality held that no reasonable
expectation of privacy exists that conversations would not be elec-
tronically monitored. A warrant, therefore, was not required.
In California, People v. Murphy followed the reasoning of the White
plurality. Significantly, Murphy was decided prior to the adoption
of a right to privacy amendment to the state constitution. Two other
jurisdictions have rejected White through protections offered by their
state constitutions. Michigan found independent state grounds under
the search and seizure provision of the state constitution, which is
361. See supra note 334 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 337-45 and accompanying text.
363. Katz, 389 U.S. at 354.
364. See supra notes 352-59 and accompanying text.
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analogous to the federal fourth amendment, to provide greater pro-
tection. Alaska used the same approach, but rejected White under
the state constitutional right to privacy, which is similar to the Califor-
nia right to privacy. Both states held that a warrant was required
prior to the use of bugged informants. California also should require
a warrant for the use of bugged informants under the state right to
privacy.
The California Constitution was amended in November 1972 to
create an inalienable right to privacy. The provision is intended to
provide protection to individuals against governmental surveillance ac-
tivities. Under this right, the burden is on the government to establish
a compelling public need to intrude on privacy in the absence of a
warrant. Protection of privacy must be sought under the constitu-
tional right to privacy because, although the California Penal Code
contains provisions against invasions of privacy, case law holds that
the statutes are not violated when one party to the conversation has
consented to electronic monitoring. Alaska has determined under the
state right to privacy that consent by one party is immaterial. The
protection offered under the similar California right to privacy,
therefore, is broader than the application of the Penal Code sections.
The warrant required prior to the use of electronic surveillance is an
insignificant burden on law enforcement in light of the benefits to
privacy interests.
Electronic surveillance is a valuable investigative tool. In the absence
of exigent circumstances, however, failure to seek a warrant is inex-
cusable. This simple procedure guards against indiscriminate use of
electronic surveillance that subjects innocent and criminal conversa-
tions alike to intrusion. The protection of constitutional rights is the
highest priority of criminal procedure. The magnitude of constitu-
tional rights far exceeds the conflicting law enforcement goal of at-
taining convictions. The California constitutional right to privacy,
therefore, demands satisfaction of minimal procedural requirements
in seeking and obtaining a warrant prior to the use of bugged
informants.
Jocelyn E. Berube
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